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This article examines the responses of national governments to the economic crisis
that commenced in 2008. We argue that the current search for new bases for accu-
mulation is leading to reforms designed to weaken the position of labour. Moreover,
the tendency towards a weakening of labour’s position was already evident across
different ‘varieties of capitalism’ before the crisis erupted. We discuss the implications
for comparative institutional analysis and stress the need for a renewed focus on the
underlying dynamics of capitalist economies.
1 INTRODUCTION
During a visit to the London School of Economics in 2009, Queen Elizabeth II asked
why economists had failed to foresee the economic crisis that erupted in 2008. In fact,
a number of economists had predicted a financial crisis (e.g. Brenner, 2004; Harvey,
2005), but these individuals were typically far from the centres of power and working
outside the mainstream of the economics profession. The assumption of most econo-
mists was that economic stability could be ensured in perpetuity thanks to improve-
ments in monetary policy that had tamed the business cycle and produced a ‘great
moderation’.1 Analyses that assumed the stability of capitalist economies were not
confined to the mainstream, however. The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) analysis
associated with Hall and Soskice (2001), and which has proved highly influential in
the field of industrial relations, was also blind to the sources of instability developing
within capitalist economies. As this article demonstrates, a preoccupation with insti-
tutions, and an associated neglect of social agency and the dynamics of the capitalist
mode of production, has left the VoC frame of analysis ill-equipped to provide
insights into the causes and consequences of the current crisis. In particular, the VoC
literature has little analytical purchase on the growth of the finance sector as a
distinctive fraction of capital, the role of the state in promoting specific accumulation
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paths and shifts in capital–labour relations, all of which have influenced the causes
and specific characteristics of the crisis. The VoC framework also provides an inad-
equate guide for understanding responses of national governments to the crisis and
the implications for workers.
We spell out our arguments theoretically and empirically in the four parts of the
article. The first section examines competing explanations of the causes of the crisis
and develops the theoretical category of financialisation. Part two examines responses
to the crisis. We argue that the current search for a new basis for accumulation is
resulting in the articulation and implementation of reforms designed to weaken the
position of labour and that this tendency is observable in countries associated with
different ‘varieties of capitalism’. While the extent of attacks on welfare and employ-
ment rights and the specific content of policies differ in important respects, it is
nevertheless clear that protections are being eroded in both ‘coordinated market’ and
‘liberal market’ economies as governments drive through reforms to deliver austerity.
In the third section, we demonstrate that the tendency towards a weakening of
labour’s position was already evident in both ‘varieties of capitalism’ long before the
crisis erupted. This tendency cannot be easily explained via the VoC framework of
analysis, which by contrast predicts that governments, employers and trade unions in
coordinated economies have an incentive to preserve employment and social protec-
tions because of the competitive advantages they supposedly confer. In the conclu-
sion, we argue that comparative political economy and industrial relations should
move beyond a preoccupation with static institutions and engage with the dynamics
of capitalism, class relations and the capitalist state.
2 THE DISPUTED ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS
The current crisis started in the United States in summer 2007 with the failure of two
Bear Stearns hedge funds that had previously speculated in unsafe mortgage-backed
securities (MBS). In September 2008, the US Treasury Secretary brought before
Congress an emergency plan to bail out the financial sector by purchasing MBS. The
plan was passed but set off a global chain reaction of panic leading to plummeting
share values and the prospect of widespread bank failures. However, while the imme-
diate trigger for the ensuing contraction in global liquidity can be relatively easily
comprehended, the underlying causes continue to be matters of debate. One popular
interpretation focuses on the growth in the importance of the financial sector since the
early 1980s, a process that governments have encouraged in various ways, particularly
through the relaxation of controls on the international mobility of financial capital.
According to this argument, inadequate regulation of financial services and the con-
sequent development of a ‘bonus culture’ created incentives for extreme risk-taking
behaviour, leading to speculative investments in unsafe assets (Elliott and Atkinson,
2009). Other interpretations have focused on the relationship between finance and the
real economy. According to Foster and Magdoff (2009), for example, the expansion
of the finance sector and the roots of the crisis lie in a long-standing decline in
opportunities for firms to make productive investments and a consequent need to find
alternative means of absorbing surplus value.2 By contrast, Nolan (2011) had empha-
2 Their arguments in this regard extend Baran and Sweezy’s (1966) earlier analysis of capitalists’ efforts to
overcome supposed tendencies to stagnation generated by the growth of ‘monopoly capitalism’.
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sised the importance of accumulating weaknesses in production, evidenced by dete-
riorating productivity growth in the decade that preceded the eruption of the crisis.
The position taken in this article is that the crisis is best understood as the culmi-
nation of processes stemming from measures that were intended to resolve the crisis
of the 1970s and that were extended over the subsequent quarter-century. These
measures, commonly referred to collectively as ‘neoliberalism’, took the form of state
policies designed to weaken the position of labour and deliver a decisive shift in the
balance of social forces in favour of the capitalist class. The term neoliberalism has
been employed in a variety of ways and has been subject to competing interpretations
(Harvey, 2005; Heyes and Nolan, 2010). Our own interpretation is in line with that of
Harvey (2010: 10), who regarded neoliberalism as a ‘class project that coalesced in the
crisis of the 1970s’ and that ‘legitimised draconian policies designed to restore and
consolidate capitalist class power’. Harvey argued that a key characteristic of neolib-
eralism was the use of state power to protect financial interests. Gamble (2009: 78)
similarly argued that ‘neo-liberalism gives priority to capital as money and therefore
to the financial circuit of capital rather than to the production circuit’. Understanding
neoliberalism, and by extension, the post-2007 crisis, therefore necessitates that atten-
tion be paid to the relationship between capital, labour and the state, on the one hand,
and to particular fractions of capital, on the other.
The term financialisation is often used as a way of expressing the growth in the scope
and importance of the role of finance in capitalist economies. Financialisation is,
however, a contested concept. Callinicos (2010) identified three possible meanings. The
first connotes a fusion of banking and industrial capital. Supporting evidence for this
idea, first developed by Rudolf Hilferding in the early 20th century, is weak, however:
industry’s reliance on bank loans as a source of finance varies considerably between
countries, being particularly strong in Germany and Japan but far weaker in the United
States, where firms often self-finance investments via retained profits. However,
examples of fusion may be seen in reverse, to the extent that non-financial companies
make a large proportion of their profits from in-house financing arms, for example,
General Electric (GE) and auto manufacturers (see Froud et al., 2006). The second
interpretation of financialisation that Callinicos identified captures the belief that the
finance sector has become increasingly autonomous, while the third emphasises the
extent to which the web of finance has extended to encompass a wider range of actors,
involving them ever more deeply in financial markets (e.g. through increased mortgage
lending, provision of credit).The latter could not have occurred without the introduc-
tion of new financial products, such as MBS, collaterised debt obligations and credit
default swaps. This alphabet soup of products gave the impression that risk had been
reduced through its more efficient allocation, allowing banks and shadow banks, such
as hedge funds, to tap into a deeper pool of investors than ever before. Such a
large-scale expansion of credit also required the recycling of global trade imbalances
from surplus to deficit countries through such innovations (Lewis, 2010; Turner, 2009).
Complementary to these interpretations are the dynamics of profit financialisation,
recognising the growth in the profit share of the financial sector of the economy and
the importance of financial transactions to the profitability of non-financial firms, and
control financialisation, whereby the maximisation of shareholder value has become
the driving force of corporate governance for listed companies (Deeg, 2010; Nölke
and Perry, 2007). A central operating presumption of financial capitalism is that
active owner–investor engagement in the interests of investors and shareholders not
only creates the market for corporate control but, in addition, promotes efficiency by
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incentivising managers to explicitly act in the interests of investor–owners rather than
an established if disparate group of stakeholders inside the firm (Jensen and Murphy,
2009). These dimensions of financialisation are, in our view, not discrete or mutually
exclusive but capture integrated processes that are both demonstrable and important.
Despite the lack of widespread evidence for ‘fusion’, the distinction between finance
and industrial capital also remains analytically important. Beginning in the early
1980s, the UK and US governments chose to pursue policies that privileged the
interests of finance above those of industry in the belief that finance could form the
basis of a new growth model. The US and UK economies subsequently experienced a
substantial expansion of the finance sector. The contribution of financial services to
US gross domestic product (GDP) increased from around 2 per cent in 1950 to
approximately 8 per cent in 2007. The finance sector’s contribution to the economy
also increased rapidly in the UK: financial services accounted for 5 per cent of gross
value added (GVA) in 1970, increasing to 8 per cent by 20073 (Feinstein, 1972;
Mitchell, 1988; Philippon, 2008; Office of National Statistics (ONS) and Bank of
England calculations; cited in Haldane et al., 2010). The finance sector’s share of total
corporate profits also mushroomed across the advanced economies. In the UK, which
witnessed the largest increase, the finance sector’s share increased 10-fold, from an
average of 1.5 per cent of total corporate profits between 1948 and 1978 to 15 per cent
in 2008 (Haldane et al., 2010).
The elements and degree of financialisation have differed between countries, reflect-
ing differences in the development and organisation of finance, the extent to which
financial institutions have developed a transnational orientation, and the importance
of the financial sector to capital accumulation within particular countries (Macartney,
2011).4 In highlighting the importance of global imbalances, the financial crisis sug-
gests two distinct strategies of accumulation with a symbiotic and ultimately crisis
producing interdependence. The first, which we may label export-led growth, was
characterised by countries running large current account surpluses and corresponding
capital account deficits, recycling those surpluses into trading partners. This strategy,
as exemplified by East Asian countries including Japan and China and Germany,
relies on competitiveness in international markets, primarily in goods, but increas-
ingly in tradable services. The second strategy of accumulation we may label finance-
led growth. Essentially, this reflects an increasing dependence of nation states upon
finance capital. Direct dependence derives from the size and profitability of financial
services as a sector, the number of jobs that it supports, its balance of trade and the
tax revenue that it generates. Just as important is a country’s indirect dependence
upon finance deriving from the provision of cheap, unsecured credit to consumers and
businesses. This serves to create demand in the economy and provides a second
important mechanism for accumulation through inflating asset prices, particularly
3 The difference between gross domestic product (GDP) and GVA calculated for the whole economy is that
the former is at market prices—including product taxes and subtracting subsidies—and the latter is at basic
prices—excluding product taxes (ESA, 1995).
4 Engelen and Konings have shown that developed economies differ on measures of the depth of financial
markets—stock and bond markets as a proportion of GDP, on financial openness—inward and outward
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), foreign ownership of public exchange traded equities and the percentage
of pension fund assets allocated to foreign markets, and on financial innovation—securitisation outstand-
ing as a percentage of GDP (2010: 609–615). Such differences are related to national specificities including
the extent to which pension funds are funded rather than pay-as-you go, the extent to which housing is
privately owned and treated as a store of wealth (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009) and the extent to which
economies are open and internationalised.
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residential property and stock markets. The boom in asset prices enables further
credit to be extended, increasing demand yet further and providing an impression of
effortless wealth accumulation. Countries that followed this strategy included the
United States, the UK, Spain and Ireland. As a consequence, ratios of household debt
to gross disposable income in these countries grew to become the highest among all
developed countries (IMF (International Monetary Fund), 2008: 18).
In both strategies of accumulation, we can identify logics that entail a weakening of
the position of labour in relation to capital. The mechanism for finance-led accumula-
tion has been well rehearsed through the demands that control financialisation creates
for high returns on capital and the consequences of this for stable, well-paid employ-
ment (Froud et al., 2006; O’Sullivan, 2000: 192–193). Flexible labour markets, minimal
welfare states and individualised wages are entirely consistent with the optimising logic
of unfettered financial capital seeking out its most profitable activities (Lewis, 2009:
54–56). Export-led accumulation creates demands for unit cost reduction, which fall on
labour directly through calls for more flexible labour markets and indirectly through
reductions in non-wage costs such as the taxes that fund welfare state services. In the
case of Germany, changes in the financing of German companies have resulted in
additional pressure to generate higher returns on capital, which, in turn, has created
downward pressure on wages (Streeck, 2009). Even prior to the crisis, these pressures
had begun to have an impact upon the labour share in Germany, precipitating a large
rise in earnings inequality, and begun to undermine sectoral wage bargaining.
As Nolan (2011: 15) had recently argued, the weakening of the position of workers
and their unions and the ‘diminishing capacity of labour institutions to exert any
influence over the definition of public policy (nationally and internationally) towards
industry, work and regulation during the last quarter of a century’ played a key part
in the creation of crisis conditions. The shift in the balance of social forces against
labour has been widespread and has taken a number of forms. Wage repression is of
particular analytical importance in understanding the conditions that gave rise to the
crisis. Since the 1980s, there has been a widespread tendency for labour’s share of total
income to diminish as productivity increases have outstripped growth in real wages.
In many countries, real wages have virtually stagnated. In the United States, the
median wage fell until the mid-1990s, followed by average growth of less than half a
per cent per annum (Glyn, 2006: 116). In Europe and Japan, average real wages have
increased at a rate of around 1 per cent per annum (ibid.). According to an analysis
by the International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) (ILO, 2008), the pattern of
decline has been similar across countries, with particularly rapid falls in the share of
wages occurring in the early 1980s and early 2000s. The exceptions to the trend have
been the Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies, the Russian Federation
and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, where the wage share
remained roughly constant (ILO, 2008: 6). Within-country inequalities, as measured
by changes in the Gini coefficient, also increased in two-third of the 85 countries
covered by the IILS study. Inequality has increased despite the claims of advocates of
financial market liberalisation that benefits would ‘trickle down’ to all members of
society. Since 1990, particularly large increases in inequality have been witnessed in
former Eastern bloc countries (Hungary, Poland) and the United States. However, an
increasing wage gap between high and low earners is evident even in countries such as
Sweden and Denmark (ILO, 2008: 12). In many European economies, increased
inequality was evident in a growth in the differential between top and middle earners,
with little change in the differential between the middle and bottom. In the United
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States and in the UK, by contrast, the differential between middle and bottom also
expanded. According to Weeks (2005: 11), ‘increases in inequality have been the result
of policies, most importantly, policies that have weakened the power of organised
labour’. His scrutiny of empirical evidence for seven OECD countries also led him to
conclude that ‘reductions in government social expenditure and abandoning full
employment as a policy goal have also played a substantial role’ in the increase in
inequality.
Financialisation has both been facilitated by the weakening of labour’s position
and contributed to the weakening by exposing workers to risk in the form of debt. As
wage shares have fallen and inequality increased, personal indebtedness has increased
substantially as a mechanism to maintain consumption in many developed countries.
While the trend is most developed in the highly financialised Anglophone countries,
interrupted by the crisis in the United States and the UK, there is also clear evidence
of growing household indebtedness in France and Italy from a lower base. Only
Germany and Japan, as exemplars of export-led accumulation, are exceptions (see
Figure 1). Financial liberalisation has also eroded the bargaining power of workers. A
recent analysis by the ILO (2009: 53) concluded that ‘for the five most financialised
countries, wage share declined by 3.6 per cent over the period 1989 to 2005, while for
the five least financialised countries, wage share declined by 2 per cent’. The effective-
ness of industrial relations institutions, such as extensive collective bargaining cover-
age and coordinated bargaining, which had previously had the effect of reducing
inequality by compressing earning differentials has, according to the ILO, been
Figure 1: Household indebtedness, 1998–2009
Note: The data show liabilities, expressed as a percentage of nominal disposable
income. Source: OECD statistics.
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reduced as a consequence of financial liberalisation (ILO, 2009: 107–109). An
increased emphasis on the maximisation of shareholder value and associated short-
termism points to a connection between shareholder value and downsizing as firm
level drivers and neoliberalism as a business system driver (Folkman et al., 2009;
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). The tendency towards control financialisation has
been exacerbated by the increased involvement of private equity funds in the owner-
ship and management of ‘portfolio’ firms. Private equity investors aggressively assert
the interests of investors and shareholders over those of other established stakehold-
ers but as owners, not managers (Clark, 2009). As intermediary owners, private equity
investors assert their interests by redefining relationships with stakeholders and trans-
forming portfolio firms into financialised assets, whereby short-term financial gains
for investors are secured by extracting value from employees or supplier stakeholders
(Clark, 2011; Rodrigues and Child, 2010: 1324–1325). Financialisation is likely to be
experienced by employees as draconian restructuring.
3 RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS
The tendency towards a weakening in the position of labour, already well under way
prior to the eruption of the crisis, is being further entrenched in the aftermath of the
economic shock as a consequence of attempts by states to resuscitate national
economies. This section of the article demonstrates this claim by comparing crisis
responses in Ireland, the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic. In the terms devel-
oped by Hall and Soskice, Germany is a prime example of a ‘coordinated market
economy’ (CME), in which institutions and networks help coordinate economic
activity by providing access to information, skills and other resources. Ireland and the
UK were classified by Hall and Soskice as ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) in
which coordination is achieved through formal contracting and market-mediated
exchanges. Nevertheless, Ireland has differed from the UK in key respects, notably
the extent to which the Irish government, trade unions and employer organisations
have participated in tripartite social dialogue. The latter has also been an important
element in economic and social policy development in the Czech Republic. While Hall
and Soskice’s original typology did not encompass CEE economies, a recent attempt
to extend it has characterised the Czech Republic as a ‘liberal-dependent’ economy
(LDE) that resembles the LME type while typically having a greater reliance on
foreign capital (King, 2007).
In discussing crisis responses, it is useful to distinguish between two phases. In
the first phase, the principal concerns of national governments were to shore up the
banks, prevent a collapse of consumer confidence and demand and address the
rapidly escalating threat to jobs. The ‘jobs crisis’ has had a number of dimensions,
the most prominent of which has been an escalation in unemployment. Every OECD
country, with the exceptions of Poland and Germany, experienced an increase in the
rate of unemployment over the period 2007–2009. Prior to the beginning of the crisis,
the unemployment rate across all OECD countries stood at a 27-year low of 5.6 per
cent. By October 2009, it had reached 8.8 per cent. The percentage increase in
unemployment in a number of individual OECD countries has been considerably
greater than the average. In Ireland, the rate of unemployment increased from 4.6 per
cent in 2007 to 13 per cent by the fourth quarter of 2009. Over the same period,
unemployment in Spain increased by more than 10 percentage points to reach 19 per
cent (European Commission, 2010).
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The most important feature of ‘phase one’ was the injection of massive fiscal stimuli
involving tax cuts and/or increased government spending. Interest rates were cut,
banks were provided with injections of capital and, in some cases, nationalised as
government sought to stave of financial collapse. The cost of banking bailout has been
estimated to have cost the equivalent of one-sixth of world GDP (Torres, 2010: 231).
During this period, the crisis was commonly framed in terms of irresponsible bankers
and inadequate or absent regulatory frameworks and agencies. Media and politicians
of all political stripes proclaimed the death of neoliberalism and argued that dominant
economic concepts of ‘rational expectations’ and ‘efficient markets’ should be con-
signed to the dustbin of history. President Sarkozy’s claim that ‘Laissez faire is
finished’ (Callinicos, 2010: 5) neatly captured what appeared to be the consensus view.
Across the EU, labour market measures accounted for a relatively small proportion
of stimulus spending compared with tax cuts and transfers. Khatiwada’s (2009:
18–19) analysis, which focused on 10 advanced and 12 developing economies, sug-
gested that on average, 1.79 per cent of total fiscal package expenditure was spent on
employment measures, although a substantial proportion of infrastructure expendi-
ture was also directed at job creation measures. A number of countries extended the
coverage of unemployment benefits (Japan, Brazil, Chile and the United States) or
increased the generosity of unemployment benefits for temporarily laid off workers
(France, Italy, Switzerland) (Khatiwada, 2009: 21). Training programmes for unem-
ployed workers were also widespread, and many countries increased the intensity of
job search assistance by offering earlier personalised assistance or career counselling
(Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the UK). However, there
were also notable differences in responses, particularly in relation to support for
measures designed to preserve jobs. The most notable aspect of Germany’s approach
to tackling the employment dimension of the economic crisis was the extensive use
of working time reductions as a means of reducing labour costs and preventing
job losses. The number of German workers in short-time work measures increased
from an average 20,000 per month in 2007 to a peak of 1.5 million during 2009 (Heyes,
forthcoming). Financial incentives were also provided so as to encourage employers
to provide additional training opportunities for partially unemployed workers.
Following discussions by the tripartite Council for Economic and Social Agree-
ment (Rada hospodárˇské a sociální dohody CˇR (RHSD)), the Czech government also
introduced a number of short-time working and training programmes. In compari-
son, government support for measures to preserve jobs in the UK and Ireland was far
more limited. While workers and employers in a number of firms in the UK reached
agreements relating to reductions in working time, the government did not introduce
support for short-time work measures, to which the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) was opposed. Limited support was provided in Ireland, although the short-time
working arrangements were relatively inflexible and only a small number of workers
were involved (no more than 4,000 by the end of 2010) (Heyes, forthcoming).
If fiscal stimulus was the defining characteristic of phase one of the response to the
crisis, the defining characteristic of phase two has been fiscal austerity. In an effort to
justify massive cuts in government spending, governments have sought to re-frame the
crisis as a product of intervention and regulation (i.e. too much state intervention in
the economy) (Thompson, 2009). Supranational institutions (in particular, the IMF),
credit rating agencies and financial interests are encouraging a return to pre-crisis
orthodoxy and the re-establishment of ‘sound finance’ through debt reduction. As
Glyn (2006: 35–37) had shown, financial interests tend to support debt reduction via
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cuts to government spending rather than increased taxation, and the current crisis
has proved no exception. Austerity measures have further weakened the position of
workers in a number of ways. Cuts in state expenditure have resulted in wage freezes
or cuts and job losses in the public sectors of several European economies. These
developments have led to strikes, protests and in the case of Ireland, the breakdown
of the tripartite social dialogue that has been a key feature of Irish industrial relations
since 1987.
The crisis has also had implications for employment rights and social protections.
Governments and employers have argued that any moves to strengthen employment
rights would impose additional costs and administrative burdens on business that
would in turn impede economic recovery and job creation. In Ireland, plans to
introduce increased penalties for abuses of employment rights have been indefinitely
delayed. In return for an €85 billion emergency rescue package provided by the IMF
and the European Central Bank in late 2010, the Irish government agreed to increases
the state pension age, cut public sector pay and pensions and reduce the national
minimum wage by 12 per cent. Following the general election of 2011, the minimum
wage was restored to its former level, although ministers now have freedom to make
changes to the minimum wage irrespective of the views of trade unions and employers.
In Germany, proposals for a national minimum wage have been shelved, opposition
within government to sectoral minimum wages has increased and a bonus scheme for
employers who take on apprentices has been abandoned. UK employers successfully
lobbied for a delay to the implementation of the EU Agency Workers Directive, the
continued exemption of small businesses from recently introduced legislation confer-
ring on workers an entitlement to request time off work for training and the aban-
donment of plans to increase the number of civic duties for which workers may take
time off work. The government has diluted protections relating to unfair dismissal
and has sought to discourage workers from taking cases to Employment Tribunals.
Furthermore, at the time of writing, the CBI is lobbying the government to increase
restrictions on the ability of workers to take strike action, a proposal to which
government ministers appear to be sympathetic. The Czech coalition government has
echoed the UK government in claiming that employment protections act as a brake
on job creation. In 2010, it announced proposals for changes to the Labour Code that
would increase employers’ freedom to employ workers on temporary contracts,
extend the ‘probationary period’ during which workers could be dismissed without
reason and reduce redundancy payments for workers with less than three years of
service. The government’s proposals resulted in industrial action and public protest
and while reforms were eventually introduced in 2011, they were less extensive than
originally envisaged.
A number of employment policy reforms have been aimed at forcing unemployed
workers to accept offers of work or training. These reforms represent an extension
and intensification of workfare measures that have taken root in much of Europe over
the past decade (Heyes, 2011). The level and duration of unemployment benefits in
Ireland was cut in 2009 and 2010, and the number of contributions that workers must
pay before becoming eligible for unemployment benefit has been doubled. In
Germany, parental leave benefits have been reduced, transitional supplements for
unemployed workers transferring to ‘long-term unemployment’ benefit have been
removed and the government has ceased paying the pension contributions of people
receiving basic income support. Employment policy reforms have also occurred in
Britain. The government has announced that under its new ‘Work’ programme, job
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advisors will be empowered to withhold benefits from unemployed workers who fail
to accept a ‘reasonable’ job offer and will no longer be able to use their discretion to
allow unemployed workers to remain on benefits. In addition, the government has
begun to test the work fitness of people claiming incapacity benefit, with the aim of
transferring many of these people to Job Seeker’s Allowance or a new Employment
Support Allowance and linking their benefit entitlements to their willingness to seek
paid employment. Similar steps have been taken in the Czech Republic. The centre-
right coalition government, which came to power in May 2010, has cut unemploy-
ment benefit entitlements for workers who quit their job or receive a severance
payment and has linked benefit entitlements more closely to workers’ willingness to
engage in active job search or training.
4 VoC IN CRISIS?
In addition to the LME, CME and CEE/LDE examples already described, ‘Mediter-
ranean market economies’ (MMEs) such as Portugal and Spain have made, or sought
to make, substantial cuts in public expenditure, involving public sector wage cuts and
reductions in the value of social benefits, and have also sought to weaken employment
protections. In other words, while responses may vary across the EU in terms of
their specific content, pace and degree, common tendencies have emerged across
different ‘varieties of capitalism’. This development is not easily explained by the VoC
approach, which emphasises that responses to ‘exogenous shocks’ will differ between
the varieties of capitalism (Iversen, 2007). Responses certainly have differed in impor-
tant respects, notably the more extensive use of short time working measures in
CMEs compared to elsewhere, yet there have also been similarities and these have
become more apparent as policy makers have turned their attention to the problem of
re-starting economic growth.
The inability of the VoC approach to either account for the crisis or the similarities
in the responses that national governments have made to it point to fundamental
weaknesses in the analytical approach. Prime among these is the problem that the
VoC does not offer an analysis of capitalism as such. The main concerns of contribu-
tors to the VoC literature have been to examine the various roles that markets,
hierarchies and networks play in coordinating economic activity and to analyse the
comparative advantages conferred by different institutional constellations. However,
the concept of capital is not employed. There are no ‘capitalists’ in the VoC account,
only ‘firms’. By extension, Hall and Soskice, and those following in their wake, pay
scant attention to the processes through which capital is accumulated and fail to
distinguish between different fractions of capital. The VoC approach has focused
implicitly on the manufacturing sector (Blyth, 2003; Bosch et al., 2007). Attention has
been given to the role of institutions in supporting distinct corporate strategies, with
an implicit focus on different types of productive activity. As far as financial capital is
concerned, the focus has been on corporate governance and firms’ access to finance.
The close ties between banks and industry that are said to typify corporate gover-
nance in CMEs such as Germany are compared with arms-length arrangements to be
found in LMEs such as the UK. In this regard, the VoC analysis contains echoes of
Hilferding’s concern with the fusion of banking and industrial interests and follows
Gershenkron (1962) in conceptualising finance as performing an intermediary func-
tion between households and firms at a national level (Engelen and Konings, 2010:
604). The internationalisation of finance has been discussed mainly in relation to its
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potential implications for corporate governance in CMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001:
60–62). The VoC has paid little attention to the development of finance as a distinctive
fraction of capital, the ways in which representatives of finance have sought to
influence government policy and the role of finance as a ‘disciplining agent on capital
accumulation’ (Albo, 2005: 69). Financialisation has tended to be neglected because
the VoC approach equates capital to the market economy, dissolving issues of exploi-
tation, distribution and conflict into coordination mechanisms such as industrial
relations institutions, training and education systems and corporate governance
arrangements. Moreover, there has been a tendency to treat national economies as
relatively closed, thereby underemphasising the importance of capital flows across the
different VoC and the consequences for economic development. While LMEs led in
the race to deregulate and enhance the power of finance capital, the connection of
national financial capital systems to an evidently global financial capitalism meant
that the eventual crisis and consequent contagion were experienced by all ‘varieties’ of
capitalism (see Stiglitz, 2003).
A second problem relates to VoC’s treatment of capital–labour relations. Accord-
ing to Hall and Soskice (2001: 24–25), many firms in CMEs rely on a highly skilled
workforce and this necessitates the development of industrial relations institutions
that will discourage poaching of skilled workers by firms and encourage workers to
cooperate with managers. The creation of industrial relations institutions is thus
explained in functionalist terms as a response to perceived risks in respect of the
supply of skills. Furthermore, Hall and Soskice (2001) argued that different ‘varieties
of capitalism’ are associated with distinct types of welfare state and training systems,
and that these differences reflect and support the strategies of firms in ‘coordinated’
and ‘liberal’ market economies. Liberal social policies encourage the flexible labour
markets and general skills that firms in LMEs, such as the UK and the United States,
are said to demand. By contrast, stronger employment protections and superior
unemployment benefits are said to encourage investments in higher level industry-
specific skills that firms in CMEs, such as Austria and Germany, are said to require
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 50–51). Hall and Soskice argued that because both employers
and workers in CMEs derive advantages from strong institutions, including employ-
ment and social protections, they are likely to take a common position in defence of
them. Rights and entitlements in respect of welfare provision and employment are
therefore likely to be maintained in CMEs. This prediction is not well supported by
the evidence. Table 1 provides information about a number of measures that capture
information about the strength of trade unions and worker entitlements. Taken
together, they suggest that a weakening in the position of labour and an erosion of
employment and social protections have been occurring in both LMEs and CMEs,
albeit to varying extents.
Trade union density varies considerably, both between countries associated with
different varieties of capitalism and between countries associated with the same
variety. Nevertheless, density rates have declined in almost all countries, regardless of
the variety of capitalism with which they are associated. Among LMEs, where col-
lective bargaining is often enterprise-based, union membership losses have coincided
with a reduction in the proportion of workers who are covered by collective
bargaining. Falling density has also coincided with reduced coverage in Germany,
although in most other CMEs and MMEs, coverage has been maintained and typi-
cally remains far more extensive than in LMEs. In general, inequality in countries
with extensive collective bargaining coverage continues to be less pronounced than in
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countries with more restricted coverage. However, the degree of inequality in many
MMEs—as measured by the Gini coefficient—is comparable with that found among
LMEs, despite marked differences in collective bargaining coverage. Moreover, the
data for a number of CMEs and MMEs, including Finland, Sweden, Austria and
Italy, suggest that high (and in some cases increased) levels of bargaining coverage
have not necessarily prevented increases in inequality among wage earners and lower
labour income shares. Apparent institutional stability may therefore mask a weaken-
ing in the ability of labour to influence distributional outcomes in these countries,
particularly given the increasing emphasis that is being placed on company-level pay
setting processes in most CMEs.
Labour income shares have tended to decrease in both LMEs and CMEs. The total
labour income share in most of the countries listed in Table 1 was lower in 2007 than
in 1985. The exceptions included the UK and the United States; however, both
countries were in the vanguard of neoliberalism and experienced a downward shift in
labour income share at an earlier point (the late 1970s in the case of the United States
and the early 1980s in the case of the UK). New Zealand and Australia also experi-
enced a downward trend shift in the early 1980s, as did the Netherlands. While the
data for Denmark suggest stability, the labour income share from the mid-1990s
onwards was consistently lower than it had been during the preceding 20 years.
The strength of employment protections, as measured by the OECD’s Employment
Protection Legislation index, has weakened in many countries over the past 30 years
(Heyes, 2011). This is not to say that there has been an untrammelled race to the
bottom: employment rights have been strengthened for some groups within some
countries (for a discussion of Italy, see Michelotti and Nyland, 2008), while in some
LMEs, there has been a general improvement in recent years, albeit from a very low
base. The influence of European social policy has clearly exerted an important influ-
ence on employment rights in some of those countries with relatively weak protections
and new member states, whose labour codes are often closely based on EU social
policy (as one element of the Acquis Communitaire). European integration has also
had other important implications for social protections. In various ways, social policy
has been oriented towards the creation of conditions that are perceived by European
policy makers as essential to maximising the competitiveness of the EU (Bosch et al.,
2007; Jessop, 2002). During the early 1990s, the Maastricht convergence criteria of
low inflation and reduced public deficits encouraged the view that ‘social protection
[is] a financial burden which blunts the competitiveness of enterprises and fuels the
potential deficit’ (Bouget, 2003: 679). This view was subsequently reinforced by the
constraints imposed by the growth and stability pact (Annesley, 2003: 152). Further-
more, the European Commission, through the European Employment Strategy, and
the OECD have encouraged a shift towards workfare-oriented social policies involv-
ing reductions in the duration of social benefits, increased restrictions on benefit
entitlements and steps to link entitlements to participation in the labour market (Van
Berkel, 2009). Simultaneously, the involvement of trade unions (and employers) in the
management of public employment services and other institutions of labour admin-
istration has been reduced in a number of countries (Weishaupt, 2011). Again, the
process has been uneven and social protections within CMEs typically remain
superior to those in LMEs. A tendency towards a weakening of social protection is
nevertheless apparent across both ‘varieties of capitalism’.
The common tendencies in evidence in both CMEs and LMEs suggest that the
influence of neoliberalism has not been confined to the latter. This is not to argue that
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economies are converging on a single model of neoliberalism. ‘Domestic sources of
differences’ in labour policy (Hamann and Kelly, 2003), including the organisations
and influence of employers and trade unions and party politics, continue to exert a
strong influence on national policy mixes. National and supranational institutions
and social forces have promoted and contested neoliberalism and shaped the pace and
content of reforms. As Macartney (2011: 21) has recently put it, ‘neo-liberalisation is
therefore played out differently on each national scale yet embedded within local,
regional and global neoliberal impulsions and tendencies’. The consequence has been
what Macartney refers to as ‘variegated neo-liberalism’.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The seriousness of the economic crisis, its perceived roots in under-regulated market
forces, and the scale of state intervention during its initial stages encouraged some
journalists and other policy commentators to declare the demise of neoliberalism.
However, as time has passed, it has become clear that a substantial reorientation of
policy has not occurred. The opportunity to rein in the agents of finance capital was
not taken and the position of labour has been further weakened as national govern-
ments have sought to re-establish fertile conditions for accumulation by slashing
public spending, diluting employment and social protections, strengthening the
workfare orientation of employment policies, attacking pensions and cutting public
sector wages and jobs. These measures represent a continuation and intensifica-
tion of neoliberal tendencies that were already apparent before the economic crisis
erupted. They are also resulting in a partial reshaping of national employment regimes
(Heyes A, forthcoming). This is not to say that the efforts of national governments to
impose austerity measures will be met entirely with successes. Industrial action and
other kinds of protest have been widespread and policy makers in some countries have
been encouraged to reconsider the scale and content of austerity measures (e.g. the
decision of the recently formed coalition government in Ireland to restore the value of
the national minimum wage). Nevertheless, it would seem that the rumours of neolib-
eralism’s death were premature.
While the specific content of policies differs between countries, attempts at reducing
workers’ rights are currently being made across all VoC. Contributors to the VoC
literature (for example Iversen, 2007) have insisted that responses to ‘exogenous
shocks’ will differ between varieties of capitalism, yet there is a clear need for analyses
that are able to account for similiarities as well as differences. Moreover, the causes
of the crisis should not be regarded as ‘exogenous’; they are a product of processes
that have been central to neoliberalism and which have been overlooked in VoC-
rooted comparative institutional analysis. In focusing on institutional complementa-
rities as sources of competitive advantage, the VoC approach has paid insufficient
attention to the processes through which capital–labour relations are being reshaped.
In particular, it has neglected the role of the state in facilitating the expansion of
finance and in weakening the position of labour and has also failed to incorporate the
contrasting growth models that were pursued from the 1980s within the scope of its
analysis. This is not to deny that studies conducted by researchers in the VoC tradi-
tion have produced valuable insights: a considerable amount has been learned about
the role that institutions play in shaping economic activities and outcomes. However,
VoC is conceptually and theoretically under-equipped to grasp the dynamics of
change within and across economies.
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Recent contributions to the literature have attempted to provide VoC analysis with
some dynamic content. Hancké et al. (2007), for example, had called for a more
sophisticated understanding of interests in capitalist societies and greater recognition
of the importance of the role of the state, which has typically received only a cursory
examination in the VoC literature. Efforts to address these lacunae are to be welcomed.
Nevertheless, despite attempts to overcome the static functionalism and equilibrium
theorising associated with Hall’s and Soskice’s seminal work (e.g. Streeck and Thelen,
2005; 2009), the most influential approaches to theorising change within a VoC
framework have maintained an emphasis on the ‘complementarity’ of institutions and
varietal stability (Hall and Thelen, 2009: 255). Furthermore, the VoC approach also
continues to struggle with the incorporation of empirical complexity. Hall and Sosk-
ice’s initial distinction between LMEs and CMEs has come to be seen as too simplistic,
leading scholars to propose an ever-growing number of ‘mixed types’ or ‘hybrids’ (e.g.
Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Perraton and Clift, 2004). However, this suggests a creeping
tendency towards having as many varieties as cases, thereby calling into question the
analytical value of the ideal types associated with VoC.5 Moreover, simply adding extra
varieties, such as ‘regional varieties’ (e.g. Amable, 2003), without a theoretical rationale
for their existence invites the charge of analytical ad-hockery.
Ultimately, the analytical limitations of the VoC, including the ongoing pre-
occupation with institutions and issues of coordination to be found in the post-Hall and
Soskice literature, reflect a fundamental problem: VoC lacks a theory of capitalism.
The crisis has made clear the need to address this deficiency. In place of VoC’s focus on
firms, transactions and the institutions through which they occur, there is a need to
reassert the analytical primacy of the concept of capital, the various forms adopted by
capital (e.g. industrial capital, interest-bearing capital) and the process of generating,
realising and investing surplus value. In other words, it is important that concrete
relationships between actors within particular capitalist societies be understood with
reference to underlying social relations that are common to capitalist societies, the
processes through which economic and social relations are reproduced and the forces
that may disrupt their reproduction. As noted, it is also important that analysis pays
heed to the bases upon which accumulation takes place. The state plays a critical role
in moulding the characteristics of national accumulation pathways (cf. Coates, 1999)
and has given concrete form to neoliberalism through policies directed at weakening
labour and promoting finance capital. However, in creating the conditions in which
finance might thrive—deregulating capital markets and weakening labour vis-à-vis
capital—the state helped to create conditions that gave rise to the current crisis.
Attempts by the state to overcome the barriers to accumulation of the 1970s therefore
ultimately served to encourage the emergence of new barriers to accumulation, which
governments and supranational agencies are now struggling to address. The contra-
dictions associated with state interventions have been neglected in the VoC literature,
which has tended to treat the state’s role in economic and social reproduction as largely
unproblematic, in that the state is generally depicted as acting so as to reproduce and
reinforce institutional sources of competitive advantage. By contrast, state theorists in
the Marxist tradition (e.g. Jessop, 2008; Poulantzas, 1973; 1978) have not regarded
economic and social reproduction as given but have instead sought to shed light on the
5 This tendency is as much the logical consequence of the ‘pure’ ideal type approach advocated by Crouch
(2005) and Becker (2009) as it is in the ‘hybrid’ literature, which they criticise for blending theory and
empirical cases.
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conditions that are necessary for reproduction to occur while seeking to explain the
state’s structural relationship to capitalism as a system of class relations. Issues that are
largely neglected in the VoC literature, such as the exercise of power, ideology, class
(and intra-class) interests and struggles, the legitimacy of state action and the difficulty
of reconciling conflicting state objectives, have been core concerns for theorists of the
capitalist state. These issues may be considered particularly pertinent at a time when
imposed austerity measures are being met with industrial action and other forms of
protest, politicians are struggling to avoid economic collapse and democratic processes
are under threat. Connecting with the insights furnished by studies of the capitalist state
may serve to enhance understanding of contemporary developments while assisting in
the longer term task of ensuring that comparative institutional analysis is rooted in an
analysis of capitalism.
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